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COMMENTS

THE PROPER STANDARD FOR DIRECTED VERDICTS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: THE INFLUENCES OF THE SEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE ERIE DOCTRINE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins' did more than merely
overrule Swift v. Tyson; 2 it overruled an entire jurisprudence. 8 The
effects of the holding have been predictably far reaching, and what has
emerged has been broadly characterized as the "Erie Doctrine."4 The
"Erie Doctrine" stands for the proposition that a federal court sitting
because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties must apply the
constitutional, statutory, and common law of the state in which it sits.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson,5 it was considered settled that in diversity suits6 federal courts were required to
adhere to state statutes and state decisions regarding matters of strictly

local law, but were free to decide matters of "general" law. The objective
of the Erie decision was to provide relief from the inequities which
arose because of variances between state and federal general standards
under Swift.7 The precise holding of Erie was that where federal law
was not controlling, federal courts sitting because of diversity jurisdiction
8
must apply the applicable state substantive law.
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study in Judicial
Precedent, 40 TEXAS L. Rtv. 509 (1962); Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins - A
Test to Determine Those Rules of State Law to Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 S.
CAL. L. Rzv. 204 (1950).
2. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

3. Prior to Erie, law was regarded as a function of reason. Precedent, as such,
did not necessarily formulate reason, but rather, gave evidence of it. Consequently,
federal courts considered themselves completely independent from state courts in the
quest to discover what was reasonable. This was true notwithstanding the federal
government was otherwise without constitutional authority to create certain rights or
obligations in the first instance. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101-02
(1945).
4. See Seaboard Finance Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507, 513 (1967). See
generally Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 427 (1958).
5. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
6. See Doub, Time for Re-evaluation: Should We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?, 44 A.B.A.J. 243 (1958); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between
United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928) ; Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTUMP. PROB. 216,
234-40 (1948).
7. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-77 (1938) ; Horowitz, Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins - A Test to Determine Those Rules of State Law to Which Its Doctrine
Applies, 23 S. CAL. L. Riv. 204, 214-15 (1950) ; Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift
v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A.J. 609 (1938).
8.
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the
law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest
court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or "general," be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
304 U.S. at 79.
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Because of the language employed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Erie decision, the Supreme Court and the various circuit courts have
had to delineate the scope and application of Erie to the many areas
where the federal law conflicts with state law. It has been determined
that state law governs the manner in which presumptions operate,9
the appropriateness of resorting to res ipsa loquitur,10 the choice of law
rule," and the allocation of the burden of proof. 12 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court has concluded that Erie does not mean that state
law must resolve issues relating to the procedural operation of the Federal
Rules.' 8 The Court has also held that whether an individual is entitled
to a jury trial is purely a federal question answered through the application of federal law. 14 Left unanswered, however, is the question of
whether state or federal standards determine the sufficiency of evidence
to warrant a submission of the case to a jury. 15 It is the purpose of this
Comment to examine that precise question. The resolution of the problem of which standard to apply becomes of crucial significance when
the federal courts would direct a verdict on the basis of the evidence
presented but the state courts would submit the issue to the jury. For
example, there may be a state constitutional provision that requires
certain issues to be decided by a jury 6 or a state rule that requires only
a scintilla of evidence to take a case to the jury. 17 These provisions,
of course, clash with the generally recognized federal standard that the
court may direct a verdict if the evidence is such that reasonable men
18
could not differ as to the result.
9. Worthington Corp. v. Lease Management, Inc., 352 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965);
Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1943) ; British America Assur.
Co. v. Bowen, 134 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1943) ; 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 43.08
(2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
10. Detroit Edison Co. v. Knowles, 152 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1945) ; Hotel Dempsey
v. Teel, 128 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Andruss v. Nieto, 112 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1940) ;
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Munn, 99 F.2d 190 (4th Cir. 1938) ; Hill, State Procedural
Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. Rgv. 66, 71-72 (1955).
11. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Quigley, Congressional
Repair of the Erie Derailment, 60 MICH. L. Rev. 1031, 1033-34 (1962).
12. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlop, 308 U.S. 208 (1938) ; Sampson v. Chanell,
110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940) ; 5 MOORE, supra note 9, at 43.08; Morgan, Choice of
Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. Rzv. 153, 187 (1944) ; Note, Diversity Jurisdiction:
State Policy and the Independent Federal Forum, 39 IiND. L.J. 582, 592-93 (1964).
13. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
14. Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
15. Wratchford v, S.J. Groves & Sons, 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969) ; 5 MOORE,
supra note 9, at 50.06; Bagalay, Directed Verdicts and the Right to Trial by Jury
in Federal Courts, 42 TExAs L. Rev. 1053, 1054 (1964). See also Mercer v. Theriot,
377 U.S. 152 (1964) ; Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
16. Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
17. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 94 (1930).
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 50 authorizes the use of the directed verdict in federal courts.
For a collection of cases which analyze the various verbalizations of this standard,
see W. BARRON & A. HOLTzorF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1075 (1961).
See also Blume, Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict, 48 MICH. L. Rev.
555 (1950) ; McBaine, Trial Practice, Directed Verdicts, Federal Rule, 31 CALIF. L.
REv. 454 (1943).
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Before examining the question of whether state or federal standards
do or should govern the sufficiency of the evidence in diversity cases,
it would seem important to note some difficulties which relate to the
constitutional problems presented. In Erie, Mr. Justice Brandeis asserted
that it was necessary to overrule Swift because of the "unconstitutionality
of the course pursued"' 9 by the federal courts prior to Erie.20 This
broad statement has prompted a number of commentators to criticize
the Erie decision on the grounds that the federal courts are not bound
21
by the tenth amendment to follow state decisional law in diversity cases.
In addition, it has been suggested that Congress may constitutionally
19. The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or limiting diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction. . . . If only a question of statutory construction were
involved, we should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued
has now been made clear and compels us to do so.
304 U.S. at 77-78 (1937).
20. Few statements of the Supreme Court have engendered such widespread
debate as this constitutional reference in Erie. Many commentators seem to doubt
that the Erie doctrine rises to constitutional proportions. See, e.g., Clark, State Law
in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE
L.J. 267 (1946); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U. L. Rgv.
427, 541 (1958) Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court and the Erie
Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957); McCormick & Hewins, The
Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. Rv. 126 (1938);
Symposium - Federal Trials and Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 338 (1956); 66
HARV. L. Rzv. 1516 (1953).
21. E.g., Broh-Kahn, Amendment By Decision - More on the Erie Case, 30 Ky.
L.J. 3 (1941); Keefe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNLL L.Q. 494,

497 (1949).

The thrust of the constitutional argument centers around the principles of
federalism reflected in the tenth amendment. Mr. Justice Brandeis referred to these
principles when he quoted with approval the comments of Mr. Justice Field in his
dissenting opinion in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893):
I am aware that what has been termed the general law of the country - which
is often little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine thinks at the time
should be the general law on a particular subject - has been often advanced in
judicial opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of a state. I admit that
learned judges have fallen into the habit of repeating this doctrine as a convenient
mode of brushing aside the law of a State in conflict with their views. And I
confess that, moved and governed by the authority of the great names of those
judges, I have, myself, in many instances, unhesitatingly and confidently, but I
think now erroneously, repeated the same doctrine. But, notwithstanding the
great names which may be cited in favor of the doctrine, and notwithstanding
the frequency with which the doctrine has been reiterated, there stands, as a
perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitution of the United States,
which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments.
Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no
case permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specially authorized or
delegated to the United States. Any interference with either, except as thus
permitted, is an invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a
denial of is independence.
304 U.S. at 78-79.
Brandeis went on to declare "that in applying the doctrine this Court and the
lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution
to the several states." 304 U.S. at 80. In this light it is significant that in the decisions
following Erie, the Supreme Court has only had occasion to refer to the Constitution in two cases, and in each case implicitly refused to adopt a constitutional basis
for the Erie doctrine. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1964) ; Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
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enact substantive law for the regulation of diversity cases. 22 However,
in spite of these conflicting views it would appear that Erie was intended
to be, and should be considered to express, a constitutional doctrine.
Any other reading is undermined by the clear statement of Mr. Justice
Brandeis that the rule of Swift v. Tyson was unconstitutional. Moreover, while it is clear that Congress has the authority to enact substantive
law which must be adhered to by the states pursuant to such constitutional
provisions as the commerce clause, it is far from clear that the federal
judiciary could establish a uniform body of law in basic tort or contract
law. Such a view clearly violates the tenth amendment mandate of federalism. Accordingly, despite the disagreement as to the constitutionality
of Erie, this Comment presupposes that Erie is constitutionally required.
Although these tenth amendment implications of Erie present interesting questions, this Comment will primarily concern itself with the
constitutional problems posed by the interrelationship of Erie and the
seventh amendment right of jury trial.23 Admittedly, the right to trial
by jury was not specifically at issue in Erie, however, both the seventh
amendment and Erie have played influential roles in recent decisions
of courts confronted with the problem of choosing between a federal or
state standard governing the sufficiency of the evidence. In order to
fully develop the effects which Erie and the seventh amendment have had
on the question of sufficiency of evidence in diversity cases, this Comment
will also examine the expanding scope of the Erie doctrine, the seventh
amendment implications of decisions following Erie, and the federal
policy considerations which pervade this area of the law.
22. E.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALz L.J. 267, 273-78 (1946) ; Jackson, The Rise and Fall
of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A.J. 609, 614, 644 (1938).
In Erie, Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, rejected what he considered to be unwarranted application of "federal common law" by the federal courts in
matters which should properly be resolved under state substantive law when he stated:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. And whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its
highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal
general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or
"general," be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause
in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.
304 U.S. at 78.
While many commentators have disagreed on the tenth amendment question of
whether the Congress has authority to enact substantive law for diversity litigation,
the issue has never been resolved. E.g., Cowan, ConstitutionalAspects of the Abolition
of Federal "Common Law," 1 LA. L. Rtv. 161, 171 (1938); Schweppe, What Has
Happened to Federal Jurisprudence?, 24 A.B.A.J. 421, 423 (1938).
23. The seventh amendment to the Constitution provides:
In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rule of the common law.
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II.

HISTORY

As noted earlier Erie stood for the proposition that state law would
have to govern the substantive rights and obligations of the litigants.
As a means of ascertaining the limits of Erie the Court endorsed the
"substantive-procedural" test in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. 24 This vague
standard was soon recognized as unworkable, and consequently was
abandoned in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 25 where the Court adopted the
"outcome-determinative" test.
In York certain noteholders alleged that the defendant trust company
had breached its fiduciary duties by failing to protect their interests and
by neglecting to disclose its own self interest in sponsoring a collection
plan. The trust company moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that the state statute of limitations barred the action. The noteholders
argued that under Sibbach the federal court was not obliged to follow
the state law since limitation of action statutes had been traditionally
characterized as procedural in nature. The Court rejected the noteholders'
contention, declaring:
It is . . . immaterial whether statutes of limitation are characterized
either as "substantive" or "procedural." . . . In essense, the intent
of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court
is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship
of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine
the outcome of a litigation, as it would be tried in a State court.26
The York case clearly redefined the thrust of Erie to the extent that
the Erie rule was reduced to a mechanical test, viz. if state law substantially affects the outcome of the litigation, regardless of the traditional classification of the rule of law, that rule rather than the divergent
federal law controls the litigation.27 Criticism of the outcome-determinative test soon arose. 28 Legal scholars doubted whether the test was
required either by Erie or by the Constitution. 29 It was suggested that
24. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).

The Court in Sibbach enunciated the scope of the "sub-

stantive-procedural" approach when it stated:
Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of federal

courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal courts

authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or Constitution of the

United States; but it has never essayed to declare the substantive state law, or
to abolish or nullify a right recognized by the substantive law of the state where
the cause of action arose, save where a right or duty is imposed in a field com-

mitted to Congress by the Constitution. On the contrary it has enacted that the
state law shall be the rule of decision in the federal courts.
Id. at 9-10.
25. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

26. Id. at 109.

27. Vestal, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins: A Projection, 48 IOWA L. Rev. 248,
259 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Clark, The Tompkins Case and the Federal Rules, 24 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'y 158 (1941) ; Symposium, Federal Trials and The Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U.L.
Riv. 338, 341 (1956) ; Quigley, supra note 11.
29. E.g., Quigley, supra note 11.
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classification would lead

to the "obliteration of the role of the federal judiciary. .... ,0 One

commentator remarked that the outcome-determinative test passed over
the essential rationale of Erie which recognized that state courts were to
be organs of coordinatejudicial authority, and, instead focused on an incidental consideration of Erie, i.e., the discouragement of forum shopping. 8'
The weakness of York having become apparent, the Supreme Court
again re-examined Erie in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc. 2
There, a North Carolina plaintiff sued a South Carolina corporation in
federal court to recover damages sustained as a result of the defendant's
alleged negligence. The defense asserted by the corporation was that
the applicable state law granted an employer tort immunity from claims
prosecuted by its employees. The question, therefore, resolved itself into
one of ascertaining the employment status of the plaintiff. According to
local practice, the question of whether an individual is the defendant's
employee was one decided by the judge, not the jury. 3 The federal
court, however, elected to ignore the state practice and submitted the
question of the plaintiff's status to the jury. In approving the application
of the conflicting federal practice, Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for
the Court, remarked:
It may well be that in the instant personal-injury case the
outcome would be substantially affected by whether the issue of
immunity is decided by a judge or a jury. Therefore, were "outcome"
the only consideration, a strong case might appear for saying that
the federal court should follow that state practice.
But there are affirmative countervailing considerations at work
here. The federal system is an independent system for administering
justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential
characteristic of that system is the manner in which ...

it distributes

trial functions between judge and jury ...
The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created rights and
obligations . . . cannot in every case exact compliance with a state

rule - not bound up with rights and obligations - which disrupts
the federal system of allocating functions between judge and jury.
. .. Thus the inquiry here is whether the federal policy favoring
jury decisions of disputed fact questions should yield to the state
rule. . . .84

30. Id. at 1032.
31. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. Rzv. 489,
512-13 (1954). Cf. Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum
in Diversity Cases, 47 IOWA L. Rtv. 933 (1962).
32. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). For a discussion of this case see Bagalay, Directed
Verdicts and the Right to Trial By Jury In Federal Courts, 42 T4xAs L. Rsv. 1053
(1964); Quigley, supra note 11; Smith, Blue Ridge And Beyond: A Bird's-Eye
View of Federalism In Diversity Litigation, 36 TULANtE L. Rzv. 443 (1962); Note,
Diversity Jurisdiction: State Policy and the Independent Federal Forum, 39 IND.
L.J. 582 (1964).
33. See Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co., 230 S.C. 532, 96 S.E.2d 566 (1957).
34. 356 U.S. at 537-38.
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Significantly, the Byrd approach contemplates a two step analysis. First,
a federal court must determine whether the conflicting rule is bound
up with the rights and obligations of the litigants. Then, if the disputed
law is so inextricably bound up, Erie requires that the federal law yield.
However, if the point of disagreement is not so intimately related to
the litigants respective rights and obligations, then the court must balance
the possibility of reaching divergent outcomes and the possibility of
encouraging forum shopping against the countervailing considerations.85
Clearly, foremost among those considerations is the deep-rooted principle
that the judge's relationship with the jury is a fundamental tenet of an
independent federal judiciary. 6
The Erie metamorphosis was not completed with Byrd, for in Hanna
v. Plummer 7 the Supreme Court narrowed the situations in which the
Byrd balancing approach is permissible. In Hanna the Court confronted
a conflict between the state and the federal procedural rules - a conflict
of law which was not one which directly bore on the rights and obligations of the parties. The question to be resolved was whether the federal
rule regarding service of process preempted a contrary state rule. In
electing to follow the Federal Rules, the Court agreed with Byrd that
the outcome-determinative test was not intended to serve as a talisman. 8
Instead of grounding its decision on the Erie-York-Byrd rationale,
however, the Court looked to the Rules Enabling Act, 9 thereby avoiding
any balancing considerations, and held that service of process in a diversity
case should be made in accordance with the Federal Rules rather than
adhering to the revelant state rules on service. It is important to note
that in spite of Hanna's exclusion of the Federal Rules from the ambit
of Erie, this in no way indicates that all incidents of the federal jury
trial are outside the scope of the Erie doctrine.4 0 In summary, it may
35. See Seaboard Finance Co. v. Davis, 276 F. Supp. 507, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
36. See generally Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54
COLUm. L. Rnv. 489, 12 (1954) ; Quigley, supra note 11 at 1033-34; Comment, Federal
Rule 43(a): The Scope of Admissibility of Evidence and the Implications of the Erie
Doctrine, 62 COLUM. L. Rev. 1049, 1065 (1962) ; 58 HARV. L. Rtv. 153 (1944). The
question of what other "countervailing considerations" might exist must await further
comment by the Court. See pp. 209-12 infra for a discussion of this aspect of
the problem.
37. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
38. Id. at 466-67.
39. The Rules Enabling Act provides in part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of
the district courts of the United States in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall

preserve the right of trial by jury ...
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964).
40. The Hanna court clearly indicated that it meant to limit its decision to the
Federal Rules when it stated:
It is true that both the Enabling Act and the Erie rule say, roughly, that
federal courts are to apply state "substantive" law and federal "procedural"
law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical. For they were
designed to control very different sorts of decisions. When a situation is covered
by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a far cry from the
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply
the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
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be stated that in matters outside the Federal Rules, the Erie doctrine as
refined in York and Byrd should provide the test with which to resolve
the proper standard to be applied in submitting questions to the jury.
III.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF Erie AND ITS PROGENY
UNDER THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT: POLICY OR COMMAND?

As previously noted Erie did not involve the issue of what should
be done when the state standard for sufficiency of the evidence varies
from the federal standard. However, the underlying rationale of the
Court's decision in Byrd that federal law determines the right of jury
trial under the seventh amendment indicates the direction in which the
Court is heading. In Herron v. Southern Pacific Co.4 1 there was a state
constitutional provision that the affirmative defense of contributory negligence must be decided by the jury. The district court directed a verdict
for the defendant holding the plaintiff contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed and held that
state laws could not alter the basic function of a federal court, and that
the seventh amendment governs the distribution of functions between
judge and jury, despite state constitutional provisions to the contrary. 42
The vitality of Herron is questionable, however, since it was decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Erie. Primary attention must,
therefore, be directed at the Court's decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Co-op.4" which has been cited for the proposition that federal
courts are required to follow the federal standard in determining when
it is permissible for the court to direct a verdict.4 4 As previously noted 45

the issue to be resolved in Byrd was whether the judge or jury should
decide the employment status of plaintiff in order to determine if
defendant employer had immunity under a state workmen's compensation
statute. Despite existing state case law which reserved such decisions
to the judge, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination
that the issue be submitted to a jury. The Court recognized that under
Erie the federal courts must adhere to local law when a statute involves
state-created rights and obligations but noted that the state cases inCourt, and the Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional
restrictions.

380 U.S. at 471.
This same reasoning was employed in Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963),
where the Court decided that the standards applicable to determine if a party generally
has a right to a jury trial was such a federal matter that Erie considerations were
summarily dismissed.
41. 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
42. Id. at 94.
43. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
44. E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Schreffler, 376 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlamowitz, 351 F.2d 509 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Shirey v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 327 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Summers v. Watkins Motor Lines,
323 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1963).
45. See pp. 198-99 supra.
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terpreting the statute involved did not expressly decide whether the
matter was substantive or procedural. The Court cited both Erie and
York, and found
nothing to suggest that this rule [requiring a judge to decide the
plaintiff's status] was announced as an integral part of the special
relationship created by the statute. Thus the requirement appears
to be merely a form and mode of enforcing the immunity, [citing
York] and not a rule intended to be bound
up with the definition
46
of the rights and obligations of the parties.
Clearly, by Erie standards, the Court had concluded that the state rule
in question was not substantive in nature and, as such, plaintiff was
entitled to a jury trial. However, the Court went further and declared
that, even though assigning the issue of plaintiff's status to the jury
instead of the judge might substantially affect the outcome of the litigation
under York, thereby requiring that the state rule be applied, that there
were "affirmative countervailing considerations" which required adherence
to the federal rule. The Court felt, "under the influence - if not the
command - of the Seventh Amendment," 47 that jury verdicts were an
essential characteristic of the federal judicial system and that the state
rule must give way to an overriding "federal policy against allowing
state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts."'4 8
These crucial passages have borne considerable weight in the decisions
of those courts in the various circuits which hold that the sufficiency
of the evidence is governed by a federal test because of the seventh
amendment. 49 Typical of the decisions which have adopted the reasoning
of Byrd is Planters Manufacturing Co. v. Protection Mutual Ins. Co.5 °
where the evidence offered by the insured was found on appeal to be
sufficient to raise a question for the jury. In so deciding the court
asserted that it was required to follow the federal standard because, "if
the seventh amendment requires uniformity in the exercise of the jury
trial right in the federal courts, surely that subsumes uniformity in the
exercise of the power to direct a verdict or grant a judgment n.o.v."' 1 The
court also concluded that "[t]o permit state law to dictate when a federal
trial judge must take questions of fact from a jury by means of a directed
verdict or a judgment or a judgment n.o.v. seems hardly less disruptive
of the federal judge-jury relationship than assigning the task of resolving
factual disputes to the trial judge initially. 5 2 The crucial question to
be resolved at this juncture is, therefore, whether the seventh amendment
46. 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).

47. Id. at 537.
48. Id. at 538.
49. E.g., Cater v. Gordon Transport, Inc., 390 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Helene
Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Woods v. National
Life and Accident Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 760 (3rd Cir. 1965).
50. 380 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1967).
51. Id. at 871.
52. Id.
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commands the federal courts to apply the federal standard. It would
appear that for at least three reasons the seventh amendment does not
require such a result.
First, it is important to note that the Supreme Court has never
explicitly interpreted the seventh amendment to require the application
of a federal standard. Admittedly the Court in Byrd emphasized the
importance of preserving the independence of the federal courts and
assuring the proper distribution of judge-jury functions in federal court.
However, the Court clearly avoided grounding its decisions upon constitutional absolutes stating only that the Court's decision was "influenced"
by the seventh amendment. Since the Court had the opportunity to rest
its decision on the seventh amendment, its failure to do so undermines
any contention that the amendment controls the correct standard to be
used. Moreover, Byrd did not involve the question of the proper standard
for the quantum of evidence necessary to submit a case to the jury,
but rather the more basic question of the availability of jury trials in
diversity cases when the state rule was in conflict with the federal right.
In such an instance the Court was clearly correct in looking to the seventh
amendment since the right to a jury trial is derived from that amendment
and implemented by federal statute.53 Nevertheless, the Court did not
indicate that the seventh amendment commands that a federal standard
apply to the sufficiency of evidence and, in fact, in a footnote, it denied
that there was any necessity to consider the constitutional question.54
Therefore, it may be suggested that the federal courts which adopt this
approach are in error.
Secondly, there is a fallacy in the reasoning which concludes that,
because the seventh amendment requires a right to jury trial in certain
civil actions, all the incidents of a jury trial must be determined according
to the federal standard, including the federal standard governing sufficiency of the evidence. Such reasoning is indeed tenuous in view of the
fact that the operation of presumptions 55 and the allocation of burden
of proof 56 during the trial have been consistently controlled by state law.
It would be startling to envision every dismissal of a complaint demanding
a jury trial or every judgment n.o.v. as raising a constitutional question
under the seventh amendment. One court has expressed distaste for
such an approach by stating:
If an appellate court is of the view that the trial judge made an
error of judgment in withdrawing a case from the jury, or in
entering judgment for the defendant notwithstanding a plaintiff's
verdict, a reversal is no doubt called for; but we cannot see that
anything is gained by blowing up that error of judgment into a denial
53. Fgn. R. Civ. P. 38(a).
54. 356 U.S. 525, 537 n.10.

55. E.g., Worthington Corp. v. Lease Management, 352 F.2d 24 (6th Cir. 1965);
Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 483 (3d Cir. 1943).
56. E.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlop, 308 U.S. 208 (1938) ; 5 MooRE, supra
note 9, at 43.08.
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of the constitutional 5 7right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment.
It is submitted that the courts which consider the right to jury trial
as controlling the applicable standard have erroneously extended the
seventh amendment to situations beyond its reach.5 8 This conclusion
follows if the problem is considered as posing two separate and distinct
questions: (1) whether in a given situation there is a right to a jury
trial and (2) if such a right has been established, whether the judge or
the jury shall resolve a particular question incident to the trial. While
the seventh amendment controls the former, it is only one of several
influences on the latter - one of which is the state interest involved.
A third reason is suggested by the Supreme Court's decision in
Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.59 In Dick the Court expressly left
open the question of which standard should be applied in submitting
evidence to the jury and made no reference whatsoever to the seventh
amendment. This decision is of great significance since it was handed
down just one year after Byrd thereby giving another indication that
the seventh amendment was not deemed to require application of the
federal standard.
For the aforementioned reasons it would seem clear that the seventh
amendment does not command adherence to a federal standard. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that under the influence of the seventh amendment there exists a strong federal policy in favor of jury trials. It is
important, however, to note that this policy has not yet risen to a constitutional mandate. This conclusion is validated by language used by
the Court in Simler v. Conner.60 Once again, as in Byrd, the Court had
to decide whether plaintiff, suing to determine the amount of legal fees
he owed to his lawyer, was entitled to a jury trial. The Court held that
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial and in support of this holding stated:
We agree . . . that the right to a jury trial in the federal courts

is to be determined as a matter of federal law in diversity as well
as other actions. The federal policy favoring jury trials is of historic
and continuing strength ... Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Co-op.,
Inc. . . . Only through a holding that the jury trial right is to be
determined according to federal law can the uniformity in its exercise
which is demanded by the Seventh Amendment be achieved. 6'
If it is assumed that neither Byrd nor the seventh amendment
command that the federal standard governing sufficiency of evidence be
57. Smith v. Reimaur Oil Transport, Inc., 256 F.2d 646, 649 (1st Cir. 1958).
See also the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Dick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 455 (1959).
58. See, e.g., Prassel Enterprises, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 616 (5th
Cir. 1968).
59. 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
60. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
61. Id. at 222. (Emphasis added.)
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uniformly adopted, the remaining question to be considered is what
effect the expanded Erie doctrine, as refined in York and Byrd, should
have on the decisions of the federal courts.
IV.

APPLICATION OF THE

Erie-York-Byrd

APPROACH

The suggestion was made in the last section that the proper standard
to be applied in submitting evidence to the jury could not be resolved
by stating that the seventh amendment, as utilized in the decisions
following Erie, required the use of the federal standard. In this section
an examination of the cases adopting both the state and federal standards
will follow as a prelude to an analysis of the competing policy considerations which influence the problem in question.
A.

Cases Applying Federal Law

Although the Supreme Court has not decided the precise question
of which standard to apply for submitting a case to the jury, the circuit
courts have had occasion to pass on the matter. At the present time the
Third, 62 Fourth,6 3 Fifth,6 4 Ninth,6 i and Tenth 6 Circuits apply the federal
rule when a disparity between state and federal standards exists. Of
the cases applying federal law, Wratchford v. S. J. Groves & Sons6
presents a most thorough-going analysis. In that case plaintiff's conservatee was found at the bottom of an open highway drainage hole,
and the plaintiff maintained that defendants were negligent in not placing a grating or barricade around the hole to warn pedestrians of the
presence of the danger. The evidence was such, however, that it was
equally possible for a jury to infer that the injuries were sustained through
a prior fall, and that the conservatee merely fell into the hole while
62. "The principle of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not determine the division
of functions between court and jury. This is controlled solely by Federal law." Lind
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1960); accord, Woods v. National
Life & Accident Ins. Co., 347 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1965). Prior to Byrd, the Third

Circuit's position was that local law governed the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
See Waldron v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 141 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1944) Lennig v. New
5

York Life Ins. Co., 122 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1941). See also McI ermott v. John
Hancock Mut. IUfe Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1958).
63. Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969); Joye v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 405 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1968) ; Pinehurst, Inc. v.
Schlamowitz, 351 F.2d 509 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Summers v. Watkins Motor Lines, 323
F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Crockett v. United States, 116 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1940) ;
Gorham v. Mutual Beneficial Health & Accident Ass'n, 114 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1940).
64. Prassel Enterprises, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1968) ;
Brown v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 405 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1968) ; ABC - Paramount
Records, Inc. v. Topps Record Distrib. Co., 374 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Shirey v.
Louisville & Nashville R.R., 327 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Braud v. Baker, 324 F.2d
213 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Kirby Lumber Corp. v. White, 288 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1961) ;
Rutherford v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 276 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960); Revlon, Inc. v.
Buchanan, 271 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Reuter v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 226 F.2d
443 (5th Cir. 1955) ; but see Miller v. Boston Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 9 (5th Cr. 1959).
65. Safeway Stores v. Fannan, 308 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1962).
66. Basham v. City Bus Co., 219 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1955).
67. 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969). For other cases applying the federal standard
in the Fourth Circuit, see note 63 supra,

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss1/10

12

Williams: The Proper Standard for Directed Verdicts in the Federal Courts:
FALL

1969]

COM[MENTS

crawling for help. Since the injuries could have been caused in one of
two ways, each equally possible, the district court applied Maryland law,
and directed a verdict for the defendants on the grounds that the plaintiff
did not produce sufficient evidence to establish prima facie that the
alleged negligence proximately caused the injuries. On appeal the Fourth
Circuit reversed, holding that the question of how much evidence is
necessary before a case must be submitted to a jury on a particular
issue is one answered by federal law. Since the federal law required
the jury to choose between conflicting inferences, the court held that
the plaintiff had produced sufficient proof to have the issue of proximate
cause decided by the jury. To support its decision the court relied heavily
on Byrd. Thus, in discussing the fashion by which the federal courts
distribute the trial functions between the judge and jury, the court
remarked that "grave disruption of the federal system would result from
the application of state law rules as to the sufficiency of evidence to go
to the jury." 68 The court then observed that the rule regarding whether
or not a federal court could send a case to a jury is one not bound up
with the rights and obligations of the litigants. Indeed, the court declared
that the
choice of a rule as to the quantum of proof necessary to support
the submission of a case to a jury plays no role in the ordering of
the affairs of anyone. It is not the kind of rule which must inexorably find its governance in a diversity case in the corpus of
state law. 69
In an earlier case in the same circuit, the court reached a similar
conclusion. In Summers v. Watkins Motor Lines,70 the administratrix
of the decedent brought an action alleging negligence on the part of the
defendant and the trial judge sitting without a jury found for the plaintiff.
On appeal, the decision was affirmed. The court employed Byrd as
authority for the proposition that a "state court's judgment of the
sufficiency of evidence to avoid a directed verdict [in a companion case
decided by a jury] does not control when the same or a similar question
arises in a federal court exercising its diversity jurisdiction." 71 The
court went on to state that this rationale supports the underlying purpose
of Erie.
In the Fifth Circuit 72 the leading case supporting use of the federal
standard is Reuter v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,7" a case decided before the
Supreme Court's decision in Byrd. There the court relied exclusively on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure7 4 and the seventh amendment in
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1065-66.
323 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 123.
See note 64 supra for other Fifth Circuit cases dealing with this pre-

cise question.

73. 226 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1955).

74.by F4D.
R. Crv.
P. 38 and
39. Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1969
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announcing that the federal standard must be adhered to. The court
also advanced a policy consideration similar to that discussed in Byrd
by stating that "[i]n determining whether there is sufficient evidence
to take the case to the jury, a federal judge performs a judicial function
and is not a mere automaton. ' 75 In two cases decided after Byrd, the
Fifth Circuit in Shirey v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 78 and ABCParamountRecords, Inc. v. Topps Record Distributing Co.,7 7 reaffirmed
the efficacy of applying the federal standard. However, in both of these
cases, the court did not ground its decision on either the seventh amendment or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather the court felt
that Byrd was established authority for the proposition that the sufficiency
of the evidence to raise a question of fact for the jury was controlled
78

by federal law.
In Woods v. National Life and Accident Ins. Co.,7 9 the Third

Circuit Court of Appeals 0 was confronted with the question of which
standard to apply. In opting for the federal standard, the court could
find no precedent within its own circuit for adopting the federal standard.
Accordingly it cited with approval the recent Ninth Circuit decision in
Safeway Stores v. Fannan.s ' In Safeway the court remarkably admitted
that Byrd involved a different factual and procedural situation, but
nevertheless maintained that the result in Byrd required an application
of the federal standard.

2

Aside from the policy considerations discussed below, 83 the logical
fallacy in these decisions is evident. As noted earlier, Byrd dealt solely
with the issue of the availability of jury trial and is of doubtful authority
in determining which standard to apply for submitting evidence to the
jury. This is buttressed by the Court's decision in Dick expressly leaving
open the correct standard to be applied, thereby indicating that neither
Byrd nor the seventh amendment can at this time be cited as definitive
authority for applying a federal standard. It is perplexing that these
decisions have neglected to recognize the unsettled nature of the question
by using as authority a decision which did not decide the issue for which
it is cited. Therefore these decisions, insofar as they ground their decisions in Byrd, would appear to be in error. However, as will be noted
later in this Comment the policy considerations underlying these decisions
nevertheless justify their result.
75. 226 F.2d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1955).
76. 327 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1964).
77. 374 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1967).
78. ABC-Paramount was not so clear in its holding that Byrd decided the proper
standard as was Shirey but it did quote Byrd extensively and cited Shirey as authority
for applying the federal standard. 374 F.2d at 460.
79. 347 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1965).
80. See note 62 supra for other Third Circuit decisions applying the federal
standard.
81. 308 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1962).
82. Id. at 97.
83. See pp. 209-12 infra.
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Cases Not Applying Federal Law

Despite the opinion of the Wratchford court and the several other
courts which have chosen to apply federal law and notwithstanding the
scholarly exponents of the federal position,8 4 courts in the Second,8 5
Sixth, 6 Seventh87 and Eighth 8 Circuits rely upon the state standards.
A close analysis of these cases reveals, however, that in some instances
there is no conflict of standards. Not infrequently a court may couch
its decision in terms of whether the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence
to withstand a directed verdict and announce that Erie demands the
application of state law to determine the sufficiency of evidence. However, the real question before the court is often one of substantive law.8 9
That is, the question is whether the plaintiff proved all of the elements
of the cause of action and not whether the plaintiff failed to meet his
burden of proof. For example, in Clay County Cotton Co. v. Home Life
Ins. Co.90 the plaintiff sought to recover on an insurance policy insuring
the life of another. The policy in question contained a provision wherein
the company agreed to pay additional benefits in the event that the
insured died as a result of an accident. The company agreed to pay the
stated value of the policy but refused to pay additional amounts claiming
that the insured did not die from accidental causes. In reversing the
lower court's decision directing a verdict for the defendant, the circuit
court said, "[T]he question presented by the motion to direct a verdict
was whether a cause of action had been proved, which clearly is a
question of substantive law and state law applies." 91 However, it is
clear from the opinion that the question presented was not concerned
84. 2B W. BARRON & A. HoLTzopie, FEDERAL PRACTICS AND PROCEDURS § 871.1
(1961) ; 5 MOORE, supra note 9, at 1 50.06; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 92 (1963).
85. Presser Royalty Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 272 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1959);
Pierce Consulting Eng'r Co. v. City of Burlington, 221 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1955);
Gutierrez v. Public Service Interstate Transp. Co., 168 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1948) ; but cf.
Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965) ; Zauderer v. Continental
Cas. Co., 140 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1944).
86. Dean v. Southern Ry., 327 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1964); Gilreath v. Southern
Ry., 323 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 441
(6th Cir. 1960) ; McCrate v. Morgan Packing Co., 117 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1941)
but see Price v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 321 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1963).
87. Wieloch v. Rogers Cartage Co., 290 F.2d 235 (7th Cir. 1961) ; Nattens v.
Grolier Soc'y, 195 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1952).
88. Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Larimer, 352 F.2d 9 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Continental Can Co. v. Horton,
250 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1957) ; but see Curry v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 1
(8th Cir. 1959).
89. Trivette v. New York Life Ins. Co., 283 F.2d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 1960)
(dissenting opinion). See, e.g., Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Larimer, 352 F.2d 9 (8th
Cir. 1965) ; Schultz & Lindsay Constr. Co. v. Erickson, 352 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1965) ;
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Nicklaus, 340 F.2d 882 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Jiffy Mkts., Inc. v.
Vogel, 340 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1965) ; Price v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 321 F.2d
725 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d
Cir. 1961) ; Pierce Consulting Eng'r Co. v. City of Burlington, 221 F.2d 607 (2d Cir.
1955). See also Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152 (1964) ; Dick v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959) ; Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d
Cir. 1965).
90. 113 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1940).
91. Id. at 861.
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with the amount of proof necessary to preclude a directed verdict.
Instead, the real holding was that the district court failed to recognize
the substantive elements of the cause of action. Consequently, the validity
of these decisions as authority for applying a state standard governing
the quantum of evidence is dubious.
After the cases deciding substantive law are excepted, courts which
apply the state standard consistently maintain that Stoner v. New York
Life Ins. Co.92 is authority to support their findings that the matter of
sufficiency of evidence is a substantive question controlled by the Erie
doctrine. Under close examination, however, Stoner does not support
that proposition. In Stoner the petitioner brought an action in state
court for payments allegedly due on an accident insurance policy and
was non-suited. On appeal, the state appellate court remanded for a
new trial holding that plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to submit the
controversy to a jury. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the
plaintiff. However, the insurance company appealed, and the case was
again reversed. The error assigned by the appellate court did not relate
to the sufficiency of evidence, but rather to errors committed in the
charge to the jury. The insurance company thereupon instituted an action
for a declaratory judgment in federal court seeking a determination of
whether the insured was disabled within the meaning of the policy.
Jurisdiction was by way of diversity. The action resulted in a judgment
against the insurer. However, on appeal the circuit court held that the
evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in not following the rule
of Erie since the appropriate state law had already declared that the
evidence was sufficient.
It is suggested that the thrust of Stoner was not that state law
answers the question of what quantum of evidence is sufficient to support
a verdict. On the contrary, Stoner decided that the two prior state
decisions concluded as a matter of law that the insured was at least
prima facie within the purview of the disability clause of the policy.
Those prior decisions established the definitional standards of disability,
a substantive issue; and therefore, the circuit court erred in failing to
follow those standards. Moreover, the Court in Stoner could not have
intended to assert that a state standard for sufficiency of evidence was
to govern since in that case there was no jury in the first state trial and
the question was not argued.9 3 What is most striking about Stoner
however, is the interpretation of the holding in Stoner by the Court in
Byrd. There the Court stated in a footnote:
It was held [in Stoner] that the federal court should follow the
state rule defining the evidence sufficient to raise
a jury question
94
whether the state-created right was established.
92. 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
93. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
94. 356 U.S. at 540 n.15.

COURTS
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At that juncture the Byrd Court proceeded to distinguish Stoner from
Herron reasoning that the state rule involved in Stoner did not attempt
to deny entirely the right to a jury trial while the Arizona constitutional
provision in Herron did have such a result. The motivation of the
Byrd Court in attempting to distinguish Stoner from Herron is not
clear since, as noted earlier, Byrd did not deal with the question of sufficiency of evidence which Stoner purportedly involved while Herron
clearly involved issues similar to those resolved in Byrd. Therefore it
may be concluded that the Byrd Court could have reached the same
result without any interpretation of what it considered Stoner to hold,
and the footnote language should be considered as dicta.
Furthermore in view of Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.95 it is clear
that the Court can not be considered to have spoken finally on the proper
standard to be applied. In Dick the beneficiary under two life insurance
policies instituted suit in federal court by utilizing diversity to obtain
jurisdiction. The beneficiary sought to recover certain additional death
benefits in excess of the stated value of the policy. The plaintiff maintained that the insured's death was effected by violent and external
means thereby qualifying himself for the extra benefits. The plaintiff
successfully obtained a verdict, but the Eighth Circuit reversed. On
appeal the Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the circuit
court misapplied the substantive law of North Dakota. However, the
dicta of the case is noteworthy. The court observed:
Lurking in this case is the question whether it is proper to apply
a state or federal test of sufficiency of the evidence to support a
jury verdict where federal jurisdiction is rested on diversity of citizenship. On this question, the lower courts are not in agreement.
(citing cases) But the question is not properly here for decision
because . . . parties assumed that the North Dakota standard
applied. . . . A decision as to which standard should be applied

can well be left to another case where the question is briefed and
argued.96
Moreover it is significant that in the Supreme Court's discussion of the
open question, Stoner is never cited thereby implying that it has no
relevance to the controversy.
V.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING CHOICE OF STANDARDS

It has previously been suggested in this Comment that the Erie
doctrine was intended to reach constitutional proportions under the tenth
amendment. It has also been posited that this view can be reconciled
with the right to a jury provided for under the seventh amendment
because the seventh amendment does not require that a federal standard
95. 359 U.S. 437 (1959).
96. Id. at 444-45.
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governing sufficiency of the evidence be uniformly adopted. Therefore
any conflict in dealing with the standard to be used for directed verdicts
between the constitutional overtones of Erie under the tenth amendment
and the more explicit command of the seventh amendment can be avoided.
What cannot be avoided, however, are the policy considerations which
form the underpinnings of the Erie doctrine as refined in York and Byrd
and the "influence" exerted by the seventh amendment in deciding the
proper standard. An attempt will be made below to demonstrate that
the proper standard for submitting evidence to the jury follows from
these policy considerations.
In applying the Erie doctrine the crucial question is whether the
policies underlying the Erie-York-Byrd holdings require that federal
courts sitting in diversity jurisdictions adhere to the state standard
governing sufficiency of the evidence. Clearly a broad policy has evolved
97
since Erie which maintains that "in the absence of other considerations"
the federal courts should adhere to state law so that the outcome of the
differ substantively from that tried in a state court
litigation would ' not
"a block away." 8 A related policy consideration is the Court's desire
to eliminate forum-shopping between state and federal courts sitting in
the same state by assuming identity of outcome "so far as legal rules
determine the outcome of a litigation." 99 While the Court's desire to
eradicate forum-shopping is indeed commendable and desirable, it is
difficult to understand how the standard for sufficiency of evidence will
so affect a litigant's choice of forum as to exclude other more meaningful
considerations. For example, the difference in competence between one
judge or another or the availability of an early adjudication of the disputed
claims would seem to be more meritorious considerations. 100 Moreover,
the very purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to allow litigants a choice
of forum in disputes between citizens of two different states. 101 Clearly
the elimination of forum-shopping was not the compelling reason for
Erie but rather was merely a concomitant to the goal of Erie to achieve
uniformity of result. Therefore, the question resolves itself into one
of asking whether the Erie-York desire of uniformity of result will
be undermined by not adhering to the relevant state standard. It would
seem that a difference in procedure between a state and federal court
in submitting evidence to a jury could substantially affect the outcome
of litigation since the jury might be more easily swayed by clever trial
tactics or emotional pleas than would a judge deciding the same issue.
Therefore, were Erie and York to stand alone it would appear that a
97. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525, 536 (1958).

98. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., H. HART & H. WXCHSLtR, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THZ F1DERAL
SYSTEM 678 (1953) ; Symposium, Federal Trials and The Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw.U.L.
Rzv. 338, 341 (1956).
101. See Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw.U.L. REv. 427,
451 (1958).
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differing state standard should be adhered to in order to assure uniformity
between the state and federal court. However, additional policy considerations were declared by the Court in Byrd which provided considerable
impetus towards accepting the application of a federal standard in all
federal courts. Byrd decided that outcome was not the sole or even
primary consideration. Rather the Court admitted that the outcome of
the litigation might be substantially affected by application of the federal
requirement of a jury trial. Nevertheless the Court stated that there
existed "affirmative countervailing considerations"' 10 2 which primarily
included maintaining the "federal system [as] an independent system
for administering justice to litigants"' 0 3 and assuring that the distribution
of trial functions between judge and jury are not disrupted by state laws.
A more exacting delineation of what is included in the term "affirmative
countervailing considerations" must await further guidance from the
Court but the language in Byrd clearly marks the way.
It is questionable whether the application of a state standard for
the sufficiency of evidence would seriously undermine the independence
of the federal judiciary, and yet it is not clear that such a serious threat
is required before the federal courts will refuse to adhere to state rules.
Obviously the Supreme Court in Hanna'0 4 did not feel that a severe
threat to the independence of the federal courts was required when it
held that the federal rule for service of process must be applied, despite
a contrary state rule. Moreover any attempt to deny by state rule the
practice of federal judges to submit a fact question to the jury surely
disrupts the judge-jury relationship and militates against the proscription
of Byrd. These considerations alone suggest that the policies underlying
the Erie progeny would best be served by adopting a uniform federal
standard. Clearly, however, consideration must also be given to the
policies underlying the seventh amendment since it is relied on so heavily
by the various Courts of Appeals.
The Court in Byrd intimated that the influence of the seventh
amendment should afford a strong policy consideration in applying a
uniform federal standard. This is indicated by the fact that the Byrd
Court placed considerable emphasis on an overriding "federal policy
favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions"' 0 5 which it felt should
not yield to a contrary state rule despite the interest in applying the
state standard to avoid forum-shopping. This would indicate the Court's
desire to have certain incidents of a jury trial - once the right to a jury
has been established - controlled by federal law. While it is true that
Byrd involved the availability of a jury trial, it is also true that the
policies underlying that decision reflect an unmistakeable intent to preserve the integrity of the judge-jury relationship and to assure that
102. 356 U.S. at 537.

103. Id.
104. 380 U.S. at 460. See p. 199 supra.

105. 356 U.S. at 538.
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federal law is not frustrated by differing state practices which infringe
on the established procedures of the federal courts in assigning disputed
questions of facts to the jury. This does not mean that each and every
aspect of a jury trial should be governed by federal law under the
authority of the seventh amendment. Clearly rules pertaining to parol
evidence' 6 and privileges 0 7 must be construed as affecting the substantive
rights of the litigants and therefore within the ambit of Erie despite
any "countervailing considerations."' 0 It is submitted, however, that
rules governing the amount of proof necessary to submit a case to the
jury is not bound up with the substantive rights of the individual in
most cases, but rather are procedural rules designed to aid the federal
judge in efficiently disposing of cases where the "minds of reasonable
men" could not differ on the result. This should not prove startling
since judges have a number of jury control devices - such as granting
new trials and the power to comment on the credibility and probative
force of the evidence - which similarly limit the independence of the jury.
It is suggested that since the crucial policy underlying the Court's
holding in Byrd demands a balancing between the state rule on the one
hand and maintaining the integrity of the judge-jury relationship under
the seventh amendment on the other, the federal standard governing the
submission of evidence to the jury is appropriate. It seems unlikely
that the Supreme Court would decide otherwise since it has upheld the
federal rule in the face of a contrary state constitutional provision'0 9
0
and a state statute."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The question of the applicability of Erie in a diversity case to the
issue of whether state or federal law sets the standards to judge whether
the evidence is sufficient to warrant the sending of the case to the jury
is one ripe for determination by the Supreme Court. This is especially
true in view of the split among the various circuits. Since the Court's
more recent decisions refining Erie have tended to emphasize the independent character of the federal judicial system, it is likely that the
Supreme Court will adopt the holding and the reasoning of Wratchford.1
This conclusion finds support in the recent decision in Simler v. Conner"12
where the Court stated that irrespective of state statutory, decisional,
or constitutional law the right to a jury trial is purely a federal issue.
The Court further declared that to hold otherwise would vitiate the
106. E.g., Patterson-Ballagh Corp. v. Byron Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786 (9th

Cir. 1944).
107. E.g., Hotel Dempsey Co. v. Tell, 128 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1942).
108. See Symposium, Federal Trials and the Erie Doctrine, 51 Nw. U.L. R~v.
338 (1956).
109. Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
110. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
111. Wratchford v. S.J. Groves & Sons, 405 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1969).
112. 372 U.S. 221 (1963).
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seventh amendment. The position has already been advanced that if
federal standards determine whether or not a plaintiff is entitled to have
his case tried before a jury, it follows that federal law should decide
if a particular case is submitted to that jury. It is suggested that adoption
of a uniform federal standard governing the sufficiency of the evidence
would satisfy the underlying purpose of the Erie progeny by assuring
the independence of the federal judiciary in the distribution of trial
functions and would promote the policy considerations evident in the
seventh amendment by assuring the submission of a case to the jury
when the minds of reasonable men could differ.

Ward T. Williams
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